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Abstract  
The article considers the campaign of the Macedonian King Philip II against the Scythians in 339 
B.C. The principal objectives of this study were to determine the plans of King Philip II and the 
balance of the forces of the opposing parties. The study also analysed the course of the military 
operations and the results of the campaign. The study uses a multifaceted approach to probe the 
ancient narrative sources. It also makes a content analysis of the data, retrieved from various 
national scientific schools. The analyses reveal that Philip conducted a military campaign against 
Ateas with the help of small expeditionary forces that moved from Byzantion to the mouth of the 
River Istros (Danube).  Philip's enemy Ateas was a ruler of a small Scythian kingdom in Dobrudzha. 
The primary goals of the Macedonian king’s campaign were to capture booty and help the local 
allies. A desire to morally compensate for the unsuccessful completion of the sieges of Perinthos 
and Byzantion was the central motive of the campaign. The result of the war was determined in a 
single pitched battle. Despite the defeat of the Scythians in Dobrudzha, Philip could not deliver the 
captured booty to Macedonia because of the limited forces. The Triballoi captured this booty, and 
this devalued the success of the whole Scythian campaign. 
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Introduction 
In ancient military history, many scientific 
problems have been considered in 
historiography, but they cannot be recognised 
as thoroughly studied. These include the 
Scythian campaign of the Macedonian King 
Philip II, which was repeatedly written by 
representatives of various national scientific 
schools. However, the existing reconstructions 
of the Macedonian King’s campaign to the 
western Black Sea region have different 
significant shortcomings. They do not provide a 
comprehensive presentation of the place of the 
Scythian campaign in Philip’s general strategy, 
nor of the tactical side of the war of the 
Macedonians with the Scythians, who were the 
bearers of military traditions unique to ancient 
Europe, created by the inhabitants of the 
steppe grassland of the northern Pontic area. 
This causes a new attempt to reconstruct the 
events of the war between Philip and the 
Scythians, which is presented in this article. 
The structure of the article is determined by 
the state of historiography and the features of 
the source base. First, the primary methods of 
the research are defined, with particular 
attention to the studying of the ancient 
narrative sources. It then goes on to present 
the results by studying the sources and 
opinions of the modern researchers on the 
balance of the forces of the opposing sides, the 
history of the war and its scale. The 
“Discussion” section presents the author’s 
reconstruction of the military events of the 
Scythian campaign of Philip II. In conclusion, 
the results of the war and its consequences are 
considered. 
Methods 
Macedonian King Philip II was the creator of 
the ancient Balkan superpower, which became 
the base for the accomplishments of his 
famous son Alexander the Great in Asia. The 
foreign policy of Philip II, who first came to 
power in a small and weakened state 
represented a consistent military expansion. 
Despite their great importance, we know little 
about some of the Macedonian conquests of 
that time. This is characteristic of the barbarian 
direction, to which the Greek writers paid little 
attention. Thus, we know little not only about 
the details of Philip II’s campaign against the 
Scythian King Ateas but also about the general 
goals of the Macedonian King. In doing so, the 
study is an attempt to analyse as to why exactly 
the Scythian state became the target of the 
attack. 
This study was based on the principle of a 
multifaceted approach to the ancient narrative 
sources. Ancient texts were considered in the 
context of scholarly interpretations. Due to the 
incomplete nature of historical data, a method 
of comparative historical analysis was used. 
When analysing the Scythian warfare, the 
historical sources were used in combination 
with the archaeological information. A content 
analysis was conducted when using 
historiography. A critical research issue is 
resolved through the historical reconstructive 
method. However, the evidence of the 
temporary presence of the Macedonian 
military forces in the Danubian region and the 
features of warfare of Dobrudzhan Scythians 
has not been considered in this study. The 
further archaeological research showed the 
validity of the reconstruction of the events 
presented in this article. 
Results 
The most linear and lengthy story of Philip’s 
Scythian campaign was written by Justin, who 
retold the work of Pompeius Trogus, who, in 
turn, used the data of Theopompos (Grakov, 
1971, p. 8; Hammond, 1991, p. 503). According 
to this source, the conflict erupted when the 
ambassadors of Ateas, who had difficulties in 
the war against the Histrianoi, arrived at 
Macedonia to speak to King Philip, who was 
engaged in the siege of Byzantion. Ateas asked 
Philip for help, promising to make him his heir. 
However, after the death of the Histrian king, 
Ateas renounced the treaty and sent back the 
Macedonian soldiers that had been sent to him 
earlier. As per their negotiations, the 
Macedonian king demanded monetary 
compensation from Ateas for the costs of the 
siege of Byzantion and the payment of the 
services of the soldiers, who were sent to help 
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the Scythian ruler earlier. After all his demands 
were refused, Philip ceased the siege of 
Byzantion and marched against the Scythians, 
continuing to conduct negotiations through the 
ambassadors to conceal his intentions (IX, 2, 1-
14). An earlier extract of the same work states 
that when Philip went to Scythia, he had hoped 
to capture booty to cover the incurred 
expenses (IX, 1, 9). 
Ateas, with whom Philip began negotiations 
and then came into conflict, should probably be 
perceived as a ruler of the small Scythian 
Kingdom located in the lower Danube 
(predominantly in the territory of Dobrudzha) 
(Kallistov, 1968, p. 219; Polin, 1992, pp. 84-85; 
Andruh, 1995, pp. 76-80; Alekseev, 2003, p. 
239; Buckler, 2003, p. 487; Yordanov, 2011, p. 
202; Braund, 2015, pp. 354-355). He was 
however not the king of all Scythian lands from 
the Danube region to the Azov Sea, as written 
by some of the researchers (Shelov, 1971, pp. 
55-56; Machinskij, 1971, p. 51; Gabriel, 2002, p. 
1999). This can be agreed from the convincing 
arguments about the limited forces of Ateas, 
who had difficulties in the war against the 
Triballoi (Front. Strat., II, 4, 20, Polyaen., VII, 44, 
1) and before the conflict with Philip,  he asked 
the Macedonian king for military support in the 
struggle against the Histrianoi (Andruh, 1995, 
pp. 79-80). There is no consensus among 
specialists on the issue of comparing the 
Histrianoi with any of the communities of the 
region (Nicorescu, 1925, pp. 23-24; Danov, 
1947, p. 52; Blavatskaya, 1952, pp. 86-87; 
Kallistov, 1968, pp. 216-217; Shelov, 1971, p. 
60; Fol, 1975, p. 51). However, there is no 
doubt that this community was a regional 
military-political player, whose potential was 
not comparable with the capabilities of all 
Scythian lands (Andruh, 1995, p. 80). 
Now the question is what were the purposes of 
Philip II, who set out on a campaign against 
Ateas after a problematic campaign against 
Perinthos and Byzantion? Most researchers are 
unsatisfied with Justin’s version explaining the 
actions of the Macedonian king for his desire to 
cover financial costs by means of Scythian 
booty. Some scholars believe that it was the 
desire to boost the morale of the army, which 
failed in East Thrace, and perhaps can be called 
as one of the motives of the Scythian campaign 
(Ellis, 1976, p. 185; Harris, 1995, p. 126). 
However, others indicate it as Philip’s a desire 
to exert full control over the West Pontic coast 
(Blavatskaya, 1952, pp. 87-88). Besides, the 
intention of the Macedonian king to support 
the Getic king Kothelas, whose daughter was 
one of Philip's wives, is also one of the 
campaign prerequisites (Ellis, 1976, p. 185; 
Delev, 2008, p. 9). Additionally, there are 
several other reasons alongside a desire to 
capture rich booty, boost the morale of the 
troops and show the preserved power of 
Macedonian weapons to the inhabitants of the 
region, forced the Macedonian king to go 
north. We should cast doubt on the conclusions 
of some experts stating that the underlying 
causes of Philip’s Scythian campaign included a 
desire to stop the rapid growth of Scythian 
influence in the Balkans, which supposedly 
endangered the entire system of power of the 
Macedonian king in Thrace (Nicorescu, 1925, p. 
26; Shelov, 1971, p. 62). This conclusion is 
based on the exaggeration of the political 
influence and military resources of the kingdom 
of Ateas. 
The number of troops used by Philip is of 
considerable interest for understanding the 
nature of the started military campaign. As is 
known from the work of Diodoros, the 
Macedonian king gathered a vast army of thirty 
thousand people to capture Perinthos and 
Byzantion (XVI, 74, 5). In this case, Justin 
mentions that during the decisive battle 
between Ateas and Philip, the numerical 
superiority was on the side of the Scythians (IX, 
2, 14). According to Gabriel, there is no reason 
to believe that the Macedonian king did not use 
all available forces for the campaign and, 
therefore, Philip met with the numerically 
superior army of the Scythians in the battle, 
which can be classified as the most large-scale 
in the ancient world (2010, p. 199). We fail to 
agree upon this conclusion. This is because the 
information about scarce military resources of 
Ateas and the recently ended difficult war with 
the Histrianoi cast doubt on the supposition 
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that the Scythian king could gather such a large 
army. Besides, the nature of the description of 
events in the sources does not allow 
considering the Scythian campaign of Philip as 
comparable in scale and significance with his 
earlier campaign in East Thrace (Delev, 2008, p. 
9). Contemporaries and ancient authors of later 
time paid little attention to this conflict. As 
rightly stated by Shelov, the Scythian campaign 
did not impress the Greeks, while Diodoros did 
not mention it at all (1971, p. 62). The relatively 
short duration of the campaign indirectly points 
to the fact that the war between Philip and 
Ateas was a small-scale military conflict. 
Probably, Philip’s Scythian campaign lasted 
from the beginning of spring till the beginning 
of summer in 339 B.C. (Ellis, 1976, p. 185; 
Delev, 2008, p. 9). 
Discussion 
These nuances make it possible to agree with 
the opinion presented in historiography, 
according to which the Macedonian king used 
only part of his forces in the war against Ateas. 
Philip, at the head of a small mobile corps not 
burdened with a wagon train, marched towards 
the Scythians along the seashore (Nicorescu, 
1925, p. 26; Glotz, & Cohen, 1936, p. 345). This 
assumption correlates well with the military 
campaign of Philip II in East Thrace, during 
which the Macedonian king launched an attack 
against Chersonesos at the head of a separate 
corps (Just., IX, 1, 7). The archaeological data 
also suggest the possibility of the presence of 
Macedonian troops in the area of the city of 
Histria, which has traces of destruction, the 
connection of which with the Scythian 
campaign of Philip II has not been precisely 
established, but it is possible (Yordanov, 2011, 
p. 202). Having ceased the siege of Byzantion 
and Perinthos, the Macedonian king ordered 
the central part of the Macedonian troops with 
a wagon train and siege vehicles to move west 
and to Macedonia. Philip himself headed the 
foremost soldiers of Macedonian infantry and 
cavalry and rapidly went north, intending to 
quickly defeat the Scythians and sooner return 
to Macedonia to take control of more critical 
Greek affairs. Based on Justin's information 
about the capture of 20,000 Scythian women 
and children by Macedonians (IX, 2, 15-16), 
Nicorescu used a well-known proportion of the 
ratio of men fit for war to the total population 
as 1:5. According to his conclusion, the army of 
Ateas consisted of about 4,000-5,000 soldiers, 
while Philip’s corps consisted of 3,000 soldiers 
(1925, p. 27). It is impossible to consider these 
calculations as convincing since they are based 
on a controversial thesis about the conversion 
of all Ateas’ Scythians into slavery. It seems 
that the actual number of the opposing troops 
was higher at least twice than the amount as 
indicated by Nicorescu. 
However, little is known about the military 
operations between Philip and Ateas. The 
sources allow suggesting that the fate of the 
campaign was decided in a single battle 
(Kallistov, 1968, p. 219; Ellis, 1976, p. 186; 
Delev, 2008, p. 9). As for the spatial location of 
the battlefield, it is necessary to mention a 
fragment of the work attributed to Lucian, 
according to which the battle between Ateas 
and Philip took place near the river Istros r 
(Macrob, 10). However, as Justin argues, while 
marching towards the Scythian lands, the 
Macedonian king tried to hide his intentions, 
informing Ateas through the ambassadors of 
his desire to place the statue of Herakles at the 
mouth of the river Istros (IX, 2, 10-11). The 
Macedonian conqueror was trying to conceal 
behind religious purposes a valid reason for the 
movement of his forces towards the mouth of 
the river Istros in the Danube. Accordingly, it 
can be concluded that Philip's invasion of the 
Scythian lands and the decisive battle with the 
Scythians took place not far from an area of 
confluence of the Danube into the sea. Little is 
also known about the pitched battle. Thus, it is 
reported that ninety-year-old Ateas fell in the 
battle (Macrob, 10). Justin writes that the 
Scythians were superior to the Macedonians in 
both courage and the number of soldiers, but 
were defeated by Philip's cunning moves (IX, 2, 
14). Frontinus left a somewhat unusual 
message about the battle of the Macedonians 
and the Scythians: it stated that Philip, fearing 
that the soldiers would not withstand the 
onslaught of the Scythians, placed the most 
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reliable horsemen in the rear and ordered not 
to allow anyone to run away from the battle 
pitch and kill the most resistant of those who 
would run away. It is indicated that these 
measures have had an effect and the Scythians 
were defeated (II, 8, 14). Based on these 
incomplete data, as well as on the general 
information about the specifics of the Scythian 
warfare, experts repeatedly tried to reconstruct 
the course of the battle in general terms. Thus, 
it is widely believed that the combined use of 
phalanx and heavy cavalry became a guarantee 
of Philip’s victory over the Scythian light cavalry 
(Blavatskij, 1950, p. 26; Shelov, 1971, p. 63). It 
is difficult to argue with this general comment 
considering the strengths of the Macedonian 
army as a reason for Philip’s victory. However, 
to ensure that the actions of phalanx and 
cavalry were valid, the battle should have taken 
place in the format of close combat. Taking into 
account the leading role of horse archers in the 
troops of the Scythians, many of the 
researchers suppose that close combat was 
imposed on the Scythians by Philip (Gaebel, 
2002, p. 153; Gabriel, 2010, p. 201; Ray, 2012, 
p. 130). However, the available data suggest 
that Ateas could prefer to meet the 
Macedonians in close combat. Such a scenario 
is well combined with the general context of 
the ancient information, which mentions both 
the courage of the Scythians (Just., IX, 2, 14) 
and their onslaught (Front. Strat., II, 8, 14). In 
scientific literature, starting with Blavatskij, it is 
noted that the Scythians knew how to use the 
compact construction of cavalry. Heavy cavalry 
headed by the king was at the head of the 
troops and followed by a worse equipped mass 
of soldiers, and close combat became crucial 
(Blavatskij, 1954, p. 24, Melyukova, 1964, p. 84; 
Chernenko, 1968, p. 168). 
The archeological data also show an increasing 
importance of elite heavy equestrians in the 
Scythian warfare by the fourth century B.C.: an 
increase in the number of various armour 
(Melyukova, 1964, p. 85; Chernenko, 1968, p. 
168), as well as the appearance of long lances 
effective in combat against enemy equestrians 
and infantrymen (Chernenko, 1984, p. 234). It 
can be assumed that Ateas, using his 
superiority in numbers over the enemy, carried 
out a massive attack on Philip’s forces that 
were not successful. According to Nicorescu, 
Philip stopped the invasion of the cavalry of 
Ateas with the help of the phalanx that took a 
position between the hills, while the 
Macedonian cavalry took its place behind the 
infantry and did not allow them to flee (1925, 
p. 27). This reconstruction, based on a rather 
strange story of Frontinus, like Sekunda’s 
version (2010, p. 451), is not convincing. 
Frontinus' story requires aobviously more 
critical attitude. One should agree with 
Hammond, who thought that Frontinus 
confused the actions of the Macedonian 
cavalry and infantry (Hammond, 1994, p. 136). 
The Scythians initially attacked the Macedonian 
cavalry. Close combat began, during which the 
Macedonian king strengthened the cavalry's 
battle order by involving infantrymen. This 
manoeuvre may be a trick that, according to 
Justin, allowed Philip to defeat the Scythians, 
who were superior in courage and number. 
Speaking about the results of Philip’s Scythian 
campaign, Machinskij drew attention to two 
fragments of Justin's work, in which it is 
mentioned that Philip of Macedon ran away 
from the Scythians (XXXVII, 3, 1, XXXVIII, 7, 3). 
Accordingly, Machinskij concluded that, despite 
the defeat and death of Ateas, the Scythians 
did not lose the war against Philip (1971, p. 51). 
This conclusion does not stand up to criticism 
since it ignores the data of Theopompos in 
favour of a rhetorical fragment. Philip’s victory 
over the Scythians is confirmed not only by the 
death of Ateas in battle but also by the fact that 
the Macedonians captured rich booty. 
According to Justin, the Macedonian king did 
not find gold and silver from the Scythians, but 
he seized twenty thousand women and 
children into slavery, cattle, including twenty 
thousand of the best mares sent to Macedonia 
for horse breeding (IX, 2, 15-16). 
Indeed, Philip's victory over Ateas’ army was an 
outright military triumph. It can be assumed 
that Philip transferred the lands that were 
previously owned by Ateas to his ally Kothelas. 
The Macedonian king left the region with rich 
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trophies. His military force moved west through 
the valley of the Iskar River to the area of 
modern Sofia to return to Macedonia, going 
down along the Strymon River (Ellis, 1976, p. 
186). This return was not successful. Talking 
about the events after Ateas’ defeat, Justin 
mentions that when Philip was returning from 
Scythia, the Triballoi stood in his way and 
demanded to give part of the booty for crossing 
their land. There was an armed clash, in which 
Philip suffered a wound to his thigh. Everyone 
thought that the Macedonian king died and, 
therefore, the booty was lost (IX, 3, 1-3). This 
incident is supposed to have taken place 
because the Triballoi placed an ambush on the 
way of the Macedonians going west across 
their land in the area of the Western Balkans or 
the Iskar Valley (Delev, 2008, p. 10). According 
to Buckler, the Triballoi were driven not so 
much by the desire to capture booty but by the 
desire to get rid of Philip, whose territorial 
expansion could further affect their land (2003, 
p. 488). There are practically no grounds for 
such a conclusion: the source points out the 
claims of the Triballoi for part of the Scythian 
booty. The limited number of Philip’s corps, 
burdened by a mass of slaves and cattle, makes 
it possible to understand why the Triballoi 
decided to put forward an ultimatum and 
carried out the attack. This also explains how 
the Triballoi managed to obtain Scythian 
trophies, which could not be properly secured. 
Nevertheless, despite the king’s injury and the 
loss of the booty, the Macedonian corps could 
return to Macedonia. Indeed, the primary 
credit for this goes to the Macedonian 
commanders who participated in the Scythian 
campaign with the king (Nicorescu, 1925, p. 
28). They returned to Pella in July-August in 339 
B.C. (Nicorescu, 1925, p. 27; Ellis, 1976, p. 185; 
Delev, 2008, p. 10). 
Conclusion 
Analysing the circumstances and results of the 
Scythian campaign of Philip II, it should be 
noted that the war against Ateas was 
successful. The Macedonian corps managed to 
defeat the army of the Scythian king and 
capture much booty. However, they failed to 
deliver all the trophies to Macedonia. In the 
fight with the Triballoi, Philip was wounded, 
and the booty was lost. Shelov notes that 
Philip’s Scythian campaign is often regarded in 
literature as unsuccessful only because the 
Macedonian king lost the battle with the 
Triballoi. The researcher calls this assessment 
superficial: in his opinion, despite the 
unfortunate incident with the Triballoi, the 
primary goal of the campaign was achieved — 
the Scythians suffered a decisive defeat, and 
their king was killed (Shelov, 1971, p. 63). We 
can partly agree with this conclusion: the 
military victory over the Scythians was won; 
however, they failed to use their trophies. The 
elimination of the Scythian domination in 
Dobrudzha has not led to the growth of 
Macedonian influence in Thrace. The actual 
result was strengthening and territorial 
expansion on the part of the Triballoi and the 
Getae, whose competitor was destroyed 
(Andruh, 1995, pp. 80-83; Delev, 2008, p. 11; 
Yordanov, 2011, p. 204). The unsuccessful 
armed conflict with the Triballoi did not allow 
Philip to replenish the treasury with the 
Scythian trophies that were one of the primary 
goals of the campaign. The moral effect of the 
victory over Ateas was also lost. The errors in 
the use of the military corps should be 
regarded as one of the main reasons. Its 
strength was enough to defeat the relatively 
small troops of Ateas, but not enough for 
accompanying a large number of slaves and 
cattle on the way to Macedonia. The end of the 
campaign was a continuation of the chain of 
failures of the Macedonian king and devalued 
the success of the entire Scythian campaign 
conducted by the best and most mobile part of 
the Macedonian army, which executed a 
determined attack on the kingdom of Ateas.  
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